its borders and that the influx of large numbers of illegal immigrants threatened national sovereignty. 5 Congress hoped to achieve its goal of immigration reform through legalization, employer sanctions, and increased enforcement at United States borders. 6 Legalization, which adjusted the status of undocumented aliens already living and working in the United States, was intended to reduce the size of a large and vulnerable underclass.' Applicants for legalization who could prove they had resided in the United States since before January 1, 1982 qualified to apply for temporary, and later permanent, resident status. 8 Proponents of employer sanctions argued that the elimination of jobs attracting undocumented aliens would stop the flow of illegal immigration. 9 The sanctions include civil and criminal penalties for the knowing employment of unauthorized workers. 1 0 In order to avoid sanctions, employers must verify employment eligibility for all persons hired after November 6, 1986.11
This Note focuses on the effect of immigration reform on the employ- Cf. S. REP. 132, supra note 4, at 16 (one purpose of legalization was to eliminate "a fearful and clearly exploitable group within the United States society").
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (Supp. IV 1986). Applicants for legalization had to show means of financial support. They were also excludable, as are other immigrants, for reasons enumerated in the INA, § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982) . The legalization application period ended May 4, 1988.
9. See, e.g., S. REP. 132, supra note 4, at I (primary incentive for illegal immigration is availability of employment in United States); Immigration Control Much illegal immigration is caused by the easy entry of illegal immigrants into jobs that are very attractive when compared to employment opportunities in their homelands. Through a provision making it illegal to knowingly hire aliens who lack authorization to work in the United States, this problem can be addressed effectively. 10. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (Supp. IV 1986). Prior to the IRCA, although unlawfully present immigrants committed a crime by entering the country, employers could hire the same immigrants without breaking the law. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982) . IRCA repealed this provision, known as the Texas proviso. With the passage of the Act, an employer is subject to a civil penalty from $250 to $2000 for a first violation, from $2000 to 55000 for a second violation, and up to $10,000 for any subsequent violations. Control of Employment of Aliens, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10 (1988). Those who engage in a pattern or practice of employing unauthorized aliens are subject to criminal penalties of up to 33000 for each unauthorized alien, imprisonment for up to six months, or both. Id. 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
[Vol. [Vol. 98: 409 1986 illegal entrants. Section 101(a)(3)(A) of the IRCA provides that employers do not have to check work authorization for any person hired before the enactment of the law.'" Thus, these employees are exempt' 7 from the authorization provisions if they retain the jobs they had when the IRCA became law.
Most employers will now request work authorization before hiring.' 8 Under the present system, it is likely that an employer willing to hire an unauthorized worker will adjust wages and working conditions downward to compensate for potential fines. 9 Thus, exempt aliens face the option of remaining with their pre-1986 employers or accepting substandard terms offered by those who will hire them despite the threat of sanctions.
In addition, the fact that exempt aliens have built up ties in the United Sept. 19, 1988, at 196 (IRCA, by producing desperate class of workers willing to accept increasingly substandard wages and working conditions, has created incentives for employers to hire undocumented workers).
States renders them more vulnerable than post-1986 entrants. 2° It may be impractical or entirely impossible for members of the subclass to return to their countries of origin. Even if they wished to do so, moreover, unauthorized aliens may not be able to pay for transportation home. Voluntary surrender to the INS is not a viable option, because deportation carries serious, life-long consequences. Deportation can bar subsequent legal entry to the United States, 2 1 result in summary deportation proceedings for a later attempted illegal re-entry, 2 2 or lead to felony prosecution for a later illegal re-entry. 2 " Unwilling to risk deportation by protesting illegal conditions, exempt employees are particularly unlikely to enforce their employment rights. 2 This Note argues that the IRCA should be amended to allow members of the 1982-1986 subclass to legalize their status. The IRCA has not eliminated the illegal workforce, a primary goal of immigration reform. Instead, exempt aliens have become an even more exploited workforce. 5 To remedy this problem, Congress should change the legalization eligibility date to November 6, 1986, the date of the IRCA's passage, in order to allow this vulnerable subclass to clalm the full protection of the nation's employment laws. The proposed amendment of the IRCA would secure the goals of immigration reform, including protection of all workers' employment rights.
Section I examines the origins and purposes of the legalization provisions. It then discusses the compromise that led to the 1982 legalization eligibility date. Section II explains the reasons that the IRCA, in its pre-.sent form, will necessarily result in increased employment practice discrimination. 2 This discussion includes an examination of the employment rights of exempt aliens after the IRCA and the ineffectiveness of the law's anti-discrimination provisions for protection of the 1982-1986 subclass. Finally, Section III discusses the condition of the exempt alien in the employment market. This Section, while acknowledging the delicate political compromise that led to the IRCA, recommends that Congress re-visit its decision to establish a legalization eligibility date of 1982. 
I. HISTORY OF THE LEGALIZATION PROVISIONS

A. The Select Commission Report
Discussion of the IRCA's legalization provisions did not begin with the 1985 congressional debates on immigration reform. Five years before enactment of the IRCA, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy submitted its final report to Congress, recommending that a legalization program be established. 27 The Commission emphasized that legalization "should be consistent with U.S. interests" and "should not encourage further undocumented migration. ' 2 8 The Select Commission recommended a legalization eligibility date of January 1, 1980.29 The Commission avoided an earlier cutoff date because such a date "would permit the participation of too few undocumented/illegal aliens, leaving the United States with a substantial underclass still in illegal status .... ))'o On the other hand, the Commission did not select an eligibility date later than the release of its report, fearing that such a recommendation would encourage increased illegal immigration. 1 The Commission also refused to suggest a specific length of residency requirement. Unable to predict how quickly the legislature would act, the Commissioners believed that Congress would be better equipped to set the residency requirement. 32 The Commission did offer guidelines for determining the term of years required, recommending that Congress "balance[] the desire for incorporating a substantial number of undocumented/illegal aliens into U.S. society with the necessity of limiting that participation to those who have acquired some equity in this country." ' 3 Congress, in passing the IRCA, did not adequately balance these two competing interests. The 1982 legalization date effectively imposed a four year residency requirement that prevented a large portion of the undocumented population from incorporating into the mainstream. Consequently, a substantial underclass remains in the United States in contradiction of Congress' original goals of immigration reform.
B. Legalization of Status
Given the desirability of eliminating the category of people working in the United States without legal protection," Congress included legaliza- Witnesses also testified repeatedly that undocumented workers appeal to employers precisely because they will not report working conditions and employment arrangements that violate federal and state statutes. 3 9 Representative Rodino summed up the vulnerable position of the undocumented worker: "[U]ndocumented persons must keep all contacts with governmental authorities to an absolute minimum . . . . When their employer short changes them or doesn't pay them for overtime, or pays them less than minimum wage, they will complain to no one." 40 Members of Congress realized that the existence of a shadow population and a subterranean economy" 1 is harmful to both legal workers and aliens unlawfully present in the United States. Some witnesses and legislators maintained that the presence of undocumented workers leads to MIN. NEws at 5653 (legalization "would allow qualified aliens to contribute openly to society and it would help to prevent the exploitation of this vulnerable population in the work place").
35. The entry into the labor force of additional low-skilled workers . . . depresses the marginal productivity of all low-skilled workers [which] generally translates into lower wages. However, it may also lead to a decrease in the employment of native workers ....
The increased immigration of low-skilled workers will lead to an increase in the marginal productivity and hence the wage rate of higher-skilled workers and the return on capital ....
[Tihe losses to native low-skilled labor are more than offset by the gains to native high-skilled labor and capital. A recent General Accounting Office report confirms this theory. GAO Sept. 13, 1985) .
Increased enforcement was considered essential. As Senator Simpson observed, "Legalization in the absence of more effective enforcement is very likely to increase the illegal flow." 131 CONG. REC. zation argued, however, that granting legal status to undocumented aliens would hinder enforcement by encouraging further illegal immigration. The opposition also regarded legalization as a reward for those who had broken the law. 5 The outcome of this political stalemate, a 1982 legalization date, failed to "wipe the slate clean," 51 a necessary element of immigration reform.
Although some legislators 5 2 and many witnesses observed that a 1982 date for legalization eligibility would still leave a substantial subclass who would not qualify, 53 opposition to a later date was strong enough to overcome those arguments. As the following Section illustrates, the acceptance of the 1982 date and of legalization itself was the result of an intricate but ultimately destructive political compromise."
Although politically expedient, the compromise produced a law which cannot fulfill one of its own purposes: namely, the elimination of the vulnerable status of undocumented employees whose position in the labor force adversely affects legal workers' employment conditions. The combination of a 1982 legalization date and the imposition of employer sanctions in 198651 created the fatal flaw in IRCA. Legislators made a critical error in either assuming that most of the exempt subclass would leave after the implementation of employer sanctions or ignoring the issue altoSll,429 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1985) . See supra note 6 for a discussion of increased appropriations for enforcement.
50 
C. Congressional Consideration of the Legalization Date
The legislative debates surrounding the IRCA reflect the intensity of disagreement regarding the appropriate date for legalization eligibility. 58 In 1984, the House considered a predecessor bill to H.R. 3080, which became the IRCA. When faced with attempts to restrict eligibility, many representatives supported the House committee's proposed date of 1982. Congressman Rodino argued:
If we do not preserve the legalization formula in the committee bill, we will be condemning unknown millions of hard-working, lawabiding people-and their children-to an inhumane existence, with the constant dread of discovery and the protection of our laws denied them. 5 " Yet, as Congress reconsidered immigration reform in subsequent years, the legalization eligibility date did not change. In 1983, the Senate immigration bill had an eligibility date of 1980.6' In 1985, the Senate bill still went to conference with a date of 1 9 8 0 ,6i despite the fact that two more years had passed with aliens entering the country illegally. Those who opposed the early eligibility date were forced to accept 1982 or risk jeopardizing legalization altogether. 6 " The IRCA's supporters believed that the existence of the exempt subclass was less objectionable than the passage of employer sanctions without any legalization provision.1 3 The existence of substantial political opposition 4 to any type of legalization program increased the pressure to compromise. This section examines the vulnerability of exempt workers and the possibility of increased employer violation of labor laws. The first subsection analyzes the IRCA's anti-discrimination provisions, which redress only hiring discrimination. The next subsection develops an analogy between exempt employees and the highly exploited Bracero 6 workers, illustrating that exempt employees are especially vulnerable to employment practice discrimination. The third subsection examines how unlawfully present aliens are chilled from enforcing their employment rights.
A. The Limited Scope of the IRCA's Anti-Discrimination Provisions
Anticipating the effect that employer sanctions might have on authorized workers who look or sound foreign, 7 the IRCA includes antidiscrimination provisions 68 to address potential increased discrimination in hiring. While denying that the IRCA would lead to wholesale discrimination in hiring without such provisions," the House Judiciary Committee emphasized that it had taken "every effort . . to minimize the potential- 65. Employment practice discrimination is an employer's systematic imposition of substandard terms on a particular group of workers.
66. "Braceros" were temporary agricultural workers imported from Mexico. 68. The IRCA established legal redress for hiring discrimination that might result from employer sanctions. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) states that it is an unfair immigration-related employment practice "to discriminate against any individual (other than an unauthorized alien) with respect to the hiring .. . of the individual for employment . . . because of such individual's national origin or . . .because of such individual's citizenship status." 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (subsection letters omitted).
For a discussion of the effectiveness of these provisions, see As a result of these efforts, section 102 of the IR0A 1 broadens Title VII's coverage of national origin discrimination and outlaws discrimination based on citizenship status." The IRCA also empowers a special counsel to consider alleged violations of these provisions, 4 but Congress also has clearly stated that section 102 does not in any way restrict the powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission." Finally, the IRCA creates a taskforce to monitor the effects of the law on patterns of discrimination and to initiate legislative retraction upon a finding of widespread discrimination."" These provisions protect authorized workers. The Act does not address the problem of employment practice discrimination aimed at unlawfully present aliens. As the next subsection illustrates, exempt workers are particularly vulnerable to such discrimination. 7
B. Exempt Employees and Migrant Workers: An Analogy
The position of exempt employees is analogous to that of the migrant workers under the Bracero program. 8 That program led to "widespread abuse of both braceros and 'illegal' Mexican workers, who in some cases became virtual slaves." 7 9 Braceros were bound by contract to a specific farm and could not work legally for any other employer.
Exempt employees are in a similar situation. While able to continue working without authorization for employers who hired them before No- IV 1986) . A joint taskforce, consisting of the Attorney General, the chair of the Commission on Civil Rights, and the chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is responsible for reviewing the report. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(k)(l) (Supp. IV 1986) . If the Comptroller General makes a determination that the IRCA has resulted in a pattern of discrimination in employment, the task force must recommend appropriate legislation. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(k)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). If both houses of Congress enact a joint resolution approving the discrimination finding within 30 days of the report's issuance, employer sanctions will terminate. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(l)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). IRCA outlines expedited procedures in the House and Senate for consideration of this matter. 8 U.S.C. § § 1324a(m),(n).
Another attempt to monitor legal employment relationships is the requirement that the President report annually to Congress for three years on the implementation of the work authorization provisions, analyzing the impact of those provisions on "the employment, wages, and working conditions of United States workers and on the economy of the United States. vember 6, 1986, exempt aliens cannot provide adequate documentation for a new job, 8 0 because after the IRCA, most new employers offering standard employment terms will demand to see work authorization." Agencies that work with the undocumented population have already received reports of employer attempts to profit from this immobility. The Center for Immigrants' Rights in New York has received phone calls from exempt employees who have not been paid for months, because their employers know that they will not risk deportation by looking for new jobs. 8 2 The IRCA also included an amendment revising the temporary farmworker program (H-2A program)". The debate surrounding H-2A workers demonstrates the legislature's cognizance of the possibility of unacceptable wages and living conditions resulting from such employment immobility." The spirited congressional discussion of the H-2A program centered on whether it would ultimately deteriorate, just as the Bracero program had. 8 5 For example, Representative Gonzalez argued that the new program "guarantees that those who want to exploit cheap, foreign labor on farms and ranches can continue to do so with impunity."" 6 Representative Panetta argued in opposition that the program would result in higher employment standards. He saw the choice as "protecting [tihe existing system, where we have uncontrolled borders, employers who easily can exploit, workers who can easily be exploited . . .versus a reform bill that tries to correct those concerns." 8 7 Given the similarity between the expanded guestworker provisions and the infamous Bracero program, the Committee reporting on H.R. 3080 had to distinguish its new proposal. Mobility was the distinguishing factor. The House Judiciary Committee stated that there were two essential elements for any new guestworker program. "First, the workers must be free to move from employer to employer without risk of negative repercussions. And second, the workers must be fully protected 8 under all federal, state and local labor laws."' One Representative summed up the importance of the ability to change employers:
[I]t gives the growers their supply of labor, but what it also does is, it says: "Laborer, if that grower decides not to give you a toilet, not to give you running water, to pay you 90 cents an hour, you are no longer stuck . . . . You can, in a sense, vote with your feet." 90 The exempt subclass does not enjoy that mobility. Formally, exempt aliens have "mobility" and are fully protected by employment law. As a practical matter, however, these guarantees are illusory.
C. Statutory Employment Rights of Aliens: The Problem of Enforcement
Exempt employees retain formal employment rights, 9 1 but the passage of the IRCA will affect the likelihood of the enforcement of those rights. In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 9 the Supreme Court held that undocumented workers are covered by the National Labor Relations Act." The Court recognized that congressional attempts to secure minimum standard terms of employment required the application of the NLRA to all workers. If not protected by the NLRA, undocumented aliens present in the United States and not subject to standard terms of employment could adversely affect the employment conditions of lawful employees." Similarly, courts have construed laws protecting migrant farmworkers" 5 to protect undocumented workers as well. 96 Analogously, the Occupational Safety and Health Act 9 " and the Fair Labor Standards Act 9 should cover unauthorized employees." Those who fall into the exempt category benefit from such protections, if willing to enforce the law.
Realistically, however, exempt undocumented workers will be reluctant to invoke these laws."' 0 In framing the IRCA, Congress failed to address the problem of the immobility of easily silenced exempt employees. At this time, it appears that the exempt workers will remain in the United States and continue to work."' For this reason, the Act necessarily encourages employment practice discrimination such as FLSA violations," 0 2 although exempt aliens are technically protected. Members of the exempt subclass cannot "vote with their feet." 1 03 The IRCA offers no protection to exempt employees vulnerable to abuse after the passage of sanctions.
If undocumented alien employees were excluded from participation in union activities and from protections against employer intimidation, there would be created a subclass of workers without a comparable stake in the collective goals of their legally resident co-workers, thereby eroding the unity of all the employees and impeding effective collective bargaining. (1964) , which explains deterrents to the braceros' organization for better employment conditions. In a position analogous to the braceros, the exempt subclass will have many of the same reasons for remaining silent.
It is also possible that some lower courts outside the Eleventh Circuit will further deter undocumented workers from enforcing their labor rights by following the Patel district court's reasoning: "Since the employment relationship between an employer and an undocumented alien is hence not illegal under the INA, there is no reason to conclude that application of the NLRA to employment practices affecting such aliens would necessarily conflict with the terms of the INA." 660 F. Supp. at 1532 (quoting Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893). Indeed, an employer in California has used similar reasoning as a defense to a charge of sex discrimination. The case will be heard in April of 1989. 
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
Congress should act immediately to amend the IRCA for three reasons. First, the legalization provisions, in creating an exempt subclass, completely undermine a primary goal of immigration reform. Instead of eliminating a vulnerable shadow population, the IRCA simply pushes it further underground. Second, the considerations that led Congress to adopt a 1982 eligibility date are no longer valid. Third, the existence of the exempt subclass conflicts with the goals of federal employment policy. This Section discusses the rationale for an amendment that would change the date of eligibility to November 6, 1986.1'"
A. The Failure of Sanctions and 1982 Legalization
Given the ineffectiveness of employer sanctions,"' 5 the 1982 legalization date defeats a significant goal of immigration reform-the removal of a vulnerable subclass in the U.S. labor market. The 1982 date disqualified large numbers of aliens already settled in the United States at the time of the IRCA's passage. In addition, the legalization program, plagued with problems from its inception, 0 6 probably discouraged qualified individuals from applying. 107 The number of undocumented aliens who applied for legalization of status fell significantly below INS projections. Further, employer sanctions have not eliminated the incentives to hire members of the 1982-1986 subclass. Therefore, to accomplish one important goal of reform, Congress must revise the compromise date to November 6, 1986, thus eliminating a vulnerable subclass. This narrowly tailored proposal is designed only to address the problem of exempt aliens subclass. For this reason, similar amendments will not be necessary in future years.
As time passes, the concerns that motivated opponents of a later eligibility date become less valid. When Congress began serious consideration of immigration reform in 1980, many legislators did not want to encourage increased illegal immigration while considering amnesty."' 8 The proposed amendment does not raise such concerns. Since only those who can prove they were here before November 6, 1986 will qualify, an amendment at this time would not stimulate further illegal immigration. The opponents of a later date also argued that only long-term residents should qualify.' 0 9 This Note's proposal would require that aliens reside in the United States for at least the last two years.
Congress did not want to reward those who entered the country, upon hearing of the passage of a legalization program, with resident status. Although this amendment would allow some unlawfully present aliens to become legal residents, this is not a "reward." Instead, this amendment, like the original legalization program, would represent a commitment to the elimination of substandard employment terms in the United States. The proposed amendment will simply realize the IRCA's original goals more fully by legitimizing the status of aliens who will remain in the United States and continue to work here.
B. The Need to Override the Compromise
This Note proposes that the legalization date, motivated by political considerations, must be amended to reflect circumstances either unforeseen or unacknowledged by members of Congress. Political expediency led to the adoption of the 1982 eligibility date." 0 Opponents of the 1982 date were forced to accept the creation of the exempt subclass or receive no legalization program at all.
The situation created by the IRCA conflicts with the goals of a large body of federal and state employment and labor law designed to protect workers."' A primary motivation for immigration reform was the desire to eliminate the adverse impact of unauthorized employment on that policy." 2 Since the existence of the exempt subclass is a threat to the estab-lishment of minimum standard employment conditions in the United States, a 1986 legalization date is necessary for truly successful immigration reform.
Although the application deadline has passed, 3 if Congress acts quickly, the INS will be able to use resources developed for the original legalization program. Pursuant to the IRCA, the Attorney General and the INS spent six months promulgating regulations to create the infrastructure required for legalization. 1 " With legalization experience acquired already and regulations in place, the INS should be able to reimplement the program relatively efficiently.
IV. CONCLUSION
In passing the IRCA with a 1982 eligibility date, Congress compromised away meaningful immigration reform. Congress will not achieve the goals of immigration reform if it does not change the legalization eligibility date. A substantial underclass still remains in our society because of the 1982 cutoff date. Indeed, the IRCA has simply exacerbated the problem of a subterranean employment market.
Many members of the exempt subclass have remained in the United States, undermining an important goal of the IRCA. This Note argues that the effect of this subclass on the employment market justifies congressional reconsideration of the legalization eligibility cutoff. Should Congress choose not to act, we must acknowledge the price of that inaction as we "live with the deficiencies"" ' 5 of the IRCA's compromise. (Vol. 98: 409
